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Abstract 
This paper documents the unusual performance of the Village Savings and Credit 
Association (VISACAs) in The Gambia. Important organizational and operational 
technologies are highlighted in successfully supplying a range of financial services to their 
members. The important issue of the appropriate type of donor intervention is also 
explored. 
FINANCIAL INNOVATION AND DONOR INTERVENTION IN AFRICA: 
TilE VILLAGE SAVINGS AND CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS (VISACAs) 
IN THE GAMBIA. 
by 
Korotoumou Ouattara, Douglas H. Graham and Carlos E. Cuevas 
Formal and informal financial markets in The Gambia are made up of many 
segments. Banks, village savings and credit associations, cooperatives, non-governmental 
organizations, private traders, suppliers and microentrepreneurs all operate in some degree 
or the other as financial agents in The Gambia. The privatization of the banking industry 
and the liberalization of financial markets have produced a much smaller, leaner, and more 
resilient financial sector wholly dominated by private commercial banks (Graham, et al., 
Chapter 1 ). While this was in many ways a necessary and inevitable result for sound 
banking in The Gambia, that change does little to supply financial services in the rural area. 
By the year 1990, agricultural lending had declined substantially; the major rural bank 
had disappeared as an active lender; and agricultural parastatal linkages to the banking 
sector had been considerably reduced through reorganization and partial privatization. In 
the face of this growing lack of financial services in the rural sector, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) moved in to fill the gap and become the missing link to rural 
financial intermediation. Unfortunately, few NGOs were prepared to carry out any viable 
financial intermediation. Their approaches with diverse operating and financial technologies 
have only succeeded in creating negative externalities and distortions in rural financial 
markets (Graham, et al., Chapter 2). Amidst these failures, the village savings and credit 
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associations (VISACAs) have emerged as a much needed financial innovation in rural 
Gambia. 
This paper reports on the findings for the VISACA movement as part of a research 
study of the financial markets in The Gambia carried out by the Rural Finance Program at 
the Ohio State University (Graham et al. 1992). The paper will specifically document the 
evolution and performance of the VISACAs in The Gambia. However, the rather unusual 
performance of the VISACAs has attracted donor attention and the paper will address a 
legitimate concern that outside donor could kill a perfectly healthy institution unless caution 
is exercised on what constitutes appropriate donor assistance. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE VISACAs IN THE GAMBIA 
VISACAs (i.e. Village Savings and Credit Associations) have a primary objective of 
collecting local savings and making loans to individual villagers or groups. A total of six 
VISACAs function currently in villages in the Sapu region, about 350 kms East of Banjul, 
the capital of The Gambia. The VISACA pilot project was launched in 1988 with the 
Gambian Ministry of Agriculture and managed by Centre International de Developpement 
et de Recherche (CIDR) a French NGO, in cooperation with Kreditanstalt fiir Wiederauf-
bau (KFW) of Germany and the government Jahally-Pacharr Rice Project. 
Internal regulations of VISACAs are discussed and established at a general assembly 
of all villagers. Villagers decide upon membership conditions, interest rates for deposits and 
loans, and management procedures and practices. Each VISACA has a management 
committee among whose responsibilities are the evaluation and granting of loans. Each 
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management committee is composed of six to ten people, with an equal number of men and 
women. Two to three cashiers are also selected to carry out bookkeeping responsibilities. 
Accounting practices used in the VISACAs have been kept simple during this initial phase 
to facilitate cash flow management 
Membership fees have been sufficiently low (10 and 20 dalasis i.e $1 and $2) to 
attract the majority of villagers. Membership is required to make deposits and/ or receive 
loans. Some VISACAs require their members to make a one-time deposit of any amount 
in order to become eligible for future loans.1 
In general, VISACAs do not try to match the deposits of a particular person with 
his/her loan request as credit unions do with their loan multiple formulas. Instead they try 
to match the term structures of assets and liabilities of the VISACA as a whole. Loans are 
made out of three types of savings instruments, i.e. three, six, and nine month "term deposit" 
accounts. Twelve-month deposit accounts exist but have not received too much attention 
from VISACA members. Non interest bearing current account deposits (i.e. demand 
deposits) are also available but are not used for loan purposes, i.e. the VISACAs hold 100 
percent reserves on demand deposits. 
Four VISACAs set annual deposit rates at 20 percent and loan rates at 40 percent 
Two VISACAs established 40 percent annual deposit rates and 60 percent annual loan rates. 
Thus, the annualized gross intermediation margin reaches 20 percent between deposit and 
loan rates. This margin compares to formal banks deposit rates of 10 to 12 percent and 
1 It is interesting to note that CIDR did not ask the villagers to tie savings behavior to 
credit. However, on their own initiative most village VISACAs ( 4 out of 6) implemented 
the requirements of some prior savings before receiving a loan. 
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annual loan rates between 20 to 30 percent from 1988 to 1991. Furthermore, these high 
rates allow the VISACAs to more than compensate for inflation (around 10 percent over 
the past four years), generate interest earnings to cover incidental expenses, and create a 
growing surplus to service new loans. 
III. VISACA SAVINGS AND CREDIT FLOWS 
1. Savings Flows 
A Membership Participation and Savings Accumulation Through Time 
Membership in the VISACAs consists of both individuals and kafo groups. Kafos are 
homogeneous groups of individuals in a village with common interests. Members of kafo 
groups can have individual accounts as well. The VISACAs as a whole recorded a growth 
in membership in 1991 roughly 2.8 times their 1988 membership for a total of 1305 villagers 
and kafo groups. Of this total there were 676 women (52%), 574 men ( 44%) and 55 ( 4%) 
kafo groups. Further findings show that by December 1991 up to 52 percent of the villagers 
were members in some VISACAs and, for all six villages, one-third of all villagers were 
VISACA members. 
The VISACAs began collecting deposits in 1988. By December 1991, members with 
three, six and nine month savings accounts represented 47.4 percent of the total 
membership. Another 6 percent held demand deposits accounts. The most popular savings 
instrument among the membership is the six month term deposit. Twenty three percent of 
the membership held these accounts. Information from VISACA files indicate that by 
December 1991, a total of 399,693 dalasis had been mobilized cumulatively from their 
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inception by all six VISACAs in 698 demand deposits and savings accounts. At an average 
exchange rate of 1.00 dollar = 8 dalasis for the period, this amounts to a savings inflow of 
$49,961.6 dollars. Overall, VISACA members from all six villages have a relative preference 
for six month term deposits. These captured 33.8 percent of the accumulated deposit flow 
from 1988 until December 1991. 
B. Growth of Deposit Outstanding Balances 
Another revealing perspective is the trend in deposit growth for this three-year period 
of the VISACAs' life. As of December 1991, a total of 188,006 dalasis was outstanding in 
485 accounts with an average balance of 388 dalasis per account. The growth was a little 
over three-fold for total outstanding deposits of all VISACAs for the two years from January 
1st, 1989 through December 31st, 1991. Current account balances grew most rapidly (about 
8 fold) followed by 6 month deposit balances ( 4 fold) and 3 months deposits balances (3 
fold), with the longest term 9 month deposit instrument growing the slowest (2.4 times). As 
pointed out earlier in the cumulative data, the 6 month deposit account was uniformly the 
most popular savings instrument from 1989 to 1991, accounting in 1989 for 43 percent of 
total deposits, 58 percent in 1990 and 49 percent in 1991. 
2. Loan Disbursement in the VJSACAs 
A. Credit Flows Through Time and Term Matching Practices 
Lending is an important part of the VISACAs' operation and access to loans is 
valued highly. Despite what may appear as high interest rates ( 40 and 60 percent), the 
VISACA loan rates compare favorably to village money lender rates that can reach 140 
percent per year. Since the VISACAs began disbursing loans in 1989, a total of 366,709 
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dalasis (45,838 dollars) have been issued cumulatively to 1266 members as of December 
1991 resulting in an average loan size of 290 dalasis or about 36 U.S. dollars equivalent (see 
Table 1). The average loan term for all loans issued during this period has been 156 days 
(five months) which, not surprisingly, is approximately one month less than the preferred 
deposit term length. As a general policy, all VISACAs try to match the term structure of 
a given volume of loans with that of a comparable volume of deposits servicing those loans 
so as to be able to service anticipated deposit withdrawals or renewals. Thus, the 
proportion of people who receive a loan is very much dependent on membership through 
savings accounts. 
B. Loan Practices and Characteristics of the Loan Portfolio 
Loans are granted on a first-come, first-served basis according to available funds. 
VISACA loan committees make the final decision on loan approval and the amount 
approved. Collateral, often in the form of livestock or farm implements and gold jewelry 
for women, is required to secure a loan. Most loan applicants indicate trading as the 
purpose of their request although loans are issued for a wide variety of other purposes. The 
VISACAs do not engage in loan targeting. 
In the year 1991 alone, 630 loans were granted to 48.3 percent of the total 
membership of the six VISACAs (see table 1.). According to a CIDR report in 1990, most 
loans went out for trade purposes as 56 to 97 percent of village specific VISACA loans were 
given out to shopkeepers, for petty trade, sale of coarse grain, and cattle trading (CIDR, 
1990). The high share of loans for trading activity and fewer loans for farming was 
explained by the presence of other NGOs in the area that specialized in granting fertilizer 
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and farm equipment loans at very low interest rates. Given the relatively short term loans 
in the VISACAs (more commonly three to six months), most loans would not be expected 
to support agricultural production that has a longer seasonal gestation. Many loans are used 
to finance village trading activity in which the inventory turnover of goods is consistent with 
the shorter term structure and where trade margins can support higher interest rates than 
those commonly associated with agriculture. 
C. The Philosophy of Term Matching Practices 
The term matching feature so characteristic of VISACAs deserves more comment 
Any financial institution must be prepared to engage in responsible liquidity or cash flow 
management. Loan repayments must be scheduled in such a way as to facilitate deposit 
withdrawals. Moreover, this must be programmed so that possible delays in repayments do 
not lead to a liquidity crunch (i.e. an inability to service regularly scheduled deposit 
withdrawals or renewals). The VISACAs protect themselves from this risk through two 
mechanisms: the high interest rate margins pointed out earlier and the staggered scheduling 
of loan terms for a period shorter than the deposit instrument supporting this lending. The 
twenty point margin between deposit and loan rates generates substantial net interest 
earnings to contribute to the funds needed to cover deposit withdrawals in the face of late 
loan repayments. At the same time, a given volume of three month deposits are drawn 
upon to support a comparable volume of loans but staggered or shortened to two months 
or less in term, six month deposits support loans at five month terms or less, etc. In this 
way, VISACAs are able to meet obligated term deposit withdrawals when they mature 
except in the case of extreme loan delinquency, a rare event in most VISACAs. 
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III. LOAN RECOVERY PERFORMANCE 
Table 2. documents loan disbursement and loan recovery for the VISACAs for all 
954loans issued and due for repayment from January 1st 1989 through December 31st 1991. 
All due dates for repayment fell within this three year period. Five VISACAs had complete 
information on loan disbursements and loan recovery. Since Village 2 began operations 
only in 1991, none of its 29loans issued in 1991 fell due during this year. One VISACA, 
Village 3, issued 50 loans during this two year period, however, the research team was 
unable to secure any information on the loan repayment status of these loans. 
Based on the information on the four VISACAs that had a documented history of 
loan disbursements and loan recovery from January 1989 through December 31st 1991, the 
overall repayment rate was an outstanding 94.4 percent by number of loans and 94.7 percent 
by the volume of loans (Table 2, column 8). The best performing VISACAs were Village 
6 and Village 1 with a remarkable 97 percent loan recovery rate over this three year period. 
The lowest repayment was recorded by Village 5 at 90 and 92 percent a still very fine 
performance. For the VISACAs as a whole, some delay in loan repayment (typically 30 
days) is a very common phenomenon and this suggests that VISACAs may well be playing 
an interesting insurance role by allowing groundnut producers and traders, along with other 
borrowers, more flexible loan terms to repay their loans somewhat later than scheduled. 
Table 3 highlights this issues in detail through documentation of the time profile of 
loan repayments for all 906 loans in the four VISACAs discussed above. Overall roughly 
37 percent of all loans due were repaid promptly or in advance whereas 36 percent of the 
loans were repaid one month late, approximately 16 percent between one and three months 
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late, and 43 percent more than three months late (panel B, column 7). It is interesting to 
note that a significant part of all loans (30 percent) were repaid early. 
In summary, the VISACAs, record outstanding repayment records over this three year 
period. No other formal financial intermediary or NGO in The Gambia can match this 
performance with the possible exception of the branches of two foreign commercial banks 
in Banjul but no data on loan recovery or arrears are publicly available for these private 
banks, hence comparisons are not possible. Furthermore, judged on the risks inherent in 
the VISACAs portfolio, i.e. an overwhelming low income rural constituency, the above 
performance stands out as an unusual achievement. 
A final indicator of the remarkable performance of the VISACAs is its loan deposit 
ratio of 100 percent, i.e. the term matching practice of the VISACAs for loans and deposits, 
excluding demand deposits, means they operate with a one-to-one loan deposit ratio. This 
ratio is much higher than that characteristic of credit unions worldwide (SO to 60 percent) 
who hold much of their savings in deposit accounts in branches of banks rather than using 
them for loans. Similarly, this ratio is much higher than that of the private banks in The 
Gambia (33 percent) who allocate most of their deposit resources into treasury bills or other 
non-loan assets. This high ratio for the VISACAs implies a "no reserve" policy for time 
deposits, a seemingly risky practice. However, since 100 percent reserves are held on 
demand deposits this compensates for no reserves held on time deposits. 
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IV. THE EXTERNAL FUNDING ISSUE 
The VISACAs were able to mobilize 304,098 dalasis from their savings accounts (ex-
cluding current accounts which are not used for loans) while, as pointed out above, 366,709 
dalasis were issued cumulatively to members as loans (see Table 1). The shortfall in 
funding (62,611 dalasis) was obtained through external funds in June 1991. External donors 
lent 30,000 dalasis to the VISACAs' management at 11 percent annual interest for nine 
months. The management in turn lent to two VISACA villages at the same 11 percent 
interest rate for the same nine months maturity (without revealing the source of the 
funding). Each village then lent to its respective members at 40 and 60 percent annual 
interest rates for eight months. Borrowers thus paid an effective 27 percent and 40 percent 
interest on their eight months loans. For the first experiment with donor funds, the effective 
margin for VISACAs was 18.4 percent [(40% x 8/12)-(11% x 9/12)] and 31.75 percent 
[(60% x 8/12)-(11% x 9/12)] respectively. 
Donors in conjunction with the CIDR plan to reward in the future all VISACAs that 
show impressive savings and loan recovery performances. The gradual introduction of some 
outside funding could possibly allow these associations to expand their loan activities and 
engage in some term transformation (i.e. make longer term loans) as long as the relative 
share of outside money remains a distinctly minor share of total funding and is not 
associated with any earmarked or targeted loan scheme. Currently outside money has 
reached almost 10 percent (9.86 percent) of total funding and 14.7 percent of 1991 savings. 
Fortunately, all these loans were repaid by March 1992, indicating that the experiment 
worked successfully this one time. Nevertheless, it might be risky to increase this outside 
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funding much beyond the 20 percent range without placing at risk the VISACAs' incentive 
structure for repayment and saturating the market for secure lending opportunities in these 
villages. 
One important lesson of program design in the VISACA experience is to appreciate 
the logic of a two stage sequence of donor involvement in promoting local savings and credit 
associations. In the first stage, donor support was focused on promotion, technical 
assistance, and training, with a long term resident advisor working closely with the 
VISACAs. No external funding was provided for on-lending. The objective was to promote 
properly remunerated local savings deposits as the exclusive base for on-lending, thereby 
ensuring local identity and local control and autonomy in decision making, both of which 
are essential ingredients for promoting responsible loan recovery. 
The second stage, some three to four years later, allowed for some donor funding to 
be used for on-lending through the vehicle of 9 month or 1 year deposits. This expands the 
base for on-lending beyond the limits set by the local deposit base. It also allowed longer 
term loans that could support agricultural activities. However, there is little likelihood that 
these longer term loans would move substantially into agriculture if borrowers have to pay 
40 to 60 percent annualized interest charges (depending on the VISACA). It is unlikely that 
any agricultural activity earns that kind of return in The Gambia. To ensure the continued 
success of donor funding, the loan activity that grows out of this action needs to remain 
untargeted, to therefore blend into the generalized practices used for other loans. An 
important caveat to this second stage of donor intervention is thus, to limit the volume of 
outside funding for on-lending to no more than 15 to 20 percent of total lending sources. 
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Otherwise, the image of local identity, local control and, most importantly, local savings 
could become jeopardized as a donor virus could contaminate the portfolio with an 
entitlement or dole psychology, and borrowers "take the money and run." 
VI. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The single most important feature behind the VISACAs success is the local savings 
mobilization dimension that has nurtured and expanded the funding base from its inception 
in 1988 to the present. This feature quickly established the legitimacy of these young 
associations. It meant that villagers controlled their own association, guaranteed their 
autonomy in decision making and introduced a moral authority for responsible loan 
administration and loan recovery of their own funds. This locally mobilized resource base 
clearly created the environment for local village assemblies to meet and discuss such 
questions as the composition and responsibilities of the management committees and the 
establishment of interest rate policies and composition of savings instruments. 
The next stage of the VISACA movement is the most challenging, namely, expanding 
the movement into a larger number of villages in several other regions of the country. This 
action could begin to create a network of VISACAs that, in effect, would generate scale, 
scope and spatial economies and possible linkages to the banking system. That is one area 
where donor money could be effectively used This would occur only if a second level 
regional federation would emerge that could play a role in intermediating between surplus 
and deficit units within the movement, become a lender of last resort, and a service center 
for auditing and other technical assistance. It may be premature to expect this to emerge 
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in the immediate future. However, it is not an unreasonable long term objective as long as 
there are other regions in The Gambia that can generate the income streams for savings 
mobilization comparable to those generated by the Jahally-Pacharr project. 
The contrasting operational philosophies between the VISACAs, on the one hand, 
and other NGO operators in The Gambia, on the other hand, has undoubtedly led to the 
great success enjoyed by the VISACA movement today. The VISACAs are the only entity 
in The Gambia that has created a viable, village based savings and credit movement. It 
would be wise if the donor community would contain this urgent need to "pour" money to 
an operation that has proven that sound money management goes hand in hand with local 
people's money and limited outside resources. 
Table 1 
Year 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
TOTAL 
Note 1: 
Source: 
14 
Savings Accumulation (in Dalasis) vs. Loan Disbursement Through Time in 
the VISACAs from 1988 to December 1991. 
Savings1 Loans 
Amount Number Amount 
5780 0 0 
41,133 209 38,445 
128,790 427 124,615 
128,395 630 203,649 
304,098 1266 366,709 
Savings does not include demand deposits 
VISACA Files. 
Table 2 Documentation of Loan Recovery by Number of Loans and by Volume of Loans by VISACA for all Loans Issued 
from 1989 Onwards and Due for Repayment through December 1991. 
Total Loans Issued as Total Loans Issued and Loans Due and Repaid Recovery Rate for 
of December 1991 Due by December 1991 by December 1991 Loans in% 
VISACA No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Balances 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Village 1 120 44,526 72 37,470 70 36,340 97.2 97.0 
Village 2 29 2,760 0 0 0 0 
Village 31 50 13,100 48 13,035 
Village 4 406 101,113 324 72,398 307 67,388 94.8 93.1 
Village 5 387 109,350 250 72,775 226 66,975 90.4 92.0 
Village 6 274 95,860 260 88,295 252 85,945 96.9 97.3 
Total 1,266 366,709 954 283,973 855 256,648 94.4 94.7 
Source: VISACA files. 
Note 1: No information was available on Village 3 loan repayment. 
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Table 3 Basic Documentation of Time Profile of Loan Repayments in Terms of Number of Loans and Rates 
of Repayment for Total Number of Loans Issued and Due for Repayment from January 1st 1989 
Through December 31st 1991 by VISACA. 
A. Number of Loans 
Indicator /Schedule Village 1 Village 2 Village 3 Village 4 Village 5 Village 6 Total 
(1) (2) {3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Loans due 72 0 324 250 260 906 
2. Repaid on time 21 18 8 17 64 
3. Repaid ahead of 19 87 102 65 273 
time 
4. Repaid but less 25 132 67 103 3ZT 
than a month late 
5. Repaid but 1 to 3 5 61 30 46 142 
months late 
6. Repaid but more 0 9 10 20 39 
than 3 months late 
7. Undetermined 0 0 9 1 10 
length1 
B. Rates of Loan Repayment by Time Profile of Repayments 
1. Prompt recovery 29.2 5.6 3.2 65 7.1 
rate (%)2 
2. Early recovery 26.4 26.9 40.8 25.0 30.1 
rate (%)3 
3. Less than a month 34.7 40.7 26.8 39.6 36.1 
arrears rate (%t 
4. One to 3 months 6.9 18.8 12.0 17.7 15.7 
arrears rate (%t 
5. More than 3 0.0 2.8 4.0 7.7 4.3 
months arrears 
rate(%}" 
6. Undetermined 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.4 1.1 
length recovery 
rate 
7. Total recovery 97.2 94.8 90.4 96.6 94.4 
rate(%}' 
Note 1: Undetermined length refers to loans with no due date listed in VISACA files.. 
2: Prompt recovery rate was obtained by dividing the number of loans repaid on time in line 2, panel ~ 
by the number of loans due in line 1, panel A. 
3: Early recovery rate was obtained by dividing the number of loans repaid ahead of time (line 3, panel 
A) by the total loans due (line 1, panel A). 
4: Recovery rates for less than one month in arrears, from one to three months in arrears, etc. is based 
on the number of loans finally repaid during these specified periods (lines 4, 5, and 6 in panel A) over 
the number of loans due (line 1). 
5: Total recovery rate (line 7, panel B) is derived by adding up all the recovery rates estimated in lines 1-6, 
panel B. 
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